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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. This Court has already determined that

,1

»'' )rder from wl" h

Mr. Godfrey appeals constitutes a final judgment and that jurisdiction is proper. (See
Order Withdrawing Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition.)
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering the ultimate discovery sanction
of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey when: (1) Mr. Godfrey, in fact, complied with
the discovery requests by producing documents relating to him personally; (2) he, as well
as employees of the other defendant, The Beehive House, made diligent, good-faith
efforts to locate and produce the bank records requested of The Beehive House; (3) the
documents not produced were those of The Beehive House and not of Mr. Godfrey
personally; (4) the method by which the documents were requested was not procedurally
correct; and (5) the trial court never ordered Mr. Godfrey to produce the documents at
issue, even though its sanction of default judgment was based on the incorrect assumption
that it had. (R. at 461-66.)
The standard of review for imposition of discovery sanctions is abuse of
discretion. See Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
It should be noted, however, that "[w]hen the sanction imposed is that of a default
judgment, the most severe of sanctions, the trial court's range of discretion is more

1

narrow than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." Utah Dept. of Transp. v.
Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 30(b)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37(b)(2)(A through C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(Copies are set forth in the Addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves a dispute over whether defendant S. Chad Godfrey is obligated
to repay in full certain funds given him by the plaintiff. (R. at 1-32, 71-85.) During the
proceedings below, the trial court entered default judgment against Mr. Godfrey, for the
entire amount plaintiff claimed in her Complaint, as a discovery sanction because the
other defendant, The Beehive House, was unable, after good-faith efforts, to locate certain
of its bank records prior to a scheduled deposition. (R. at 461-64; R. at 548, pp. 15-20.)
Whether the trial court erred in entering said default judgment is the issue in this appeal.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Based on plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery, the trial
court struck the pleadings of Mr. Godfrey and entered default judgment against him for

2

approximately $490,000 00 < Rl1, : «11 » 2 5 2 1 ,< 1-61 6 1 ) I"1* Ii G< i ifi c > 1 in iel> filed J il 4< >tic<
of Appeal from that judgmeni

;

at 465-67.) Claims still remain against The Beehive

House. (R. at 461-64.)
This Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion to Dismiss, which it later withdrew based on
the fact that the natiii e of tl le issues oi i appeal d-f'

, •-

r-.;!:-r!\ '^.\o

facts of the remaining claims.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1

On November 29, 1995, plaintiff filed her Verified Complaint in this action,

naming as defendants The Beehive House, a Utah '* ^ ' -•' " • = -*!-<hip

J s rivi.i

Godfrey, an individual who, during the relevant period of this litigation, was employed as
the marketing director of Beehive Health, Inc., an affiliated company of The Beehive
House. (R. at 1-9, 323; R. at 548, p.
.2.

Ot I i. \ i igust 7, iyyC

ioi i lotice to Bi ad N lerrill, who served as

counsel for both defendants at that time, plaintiff noticed the deposition of Mr. Godfrey
for August 19, 1996. (R. at 117, 141-42.) The Notice of Deposition included a request
that Mr. Godfrey bring certaii I doci n i lei its tc tl le depositioi i (R at 86-88.) \, cop> of tl le
Notice of the August 19, 1996 Deposition is attached hereto in Addendum "B".)
3.

Together with the Notice of Deposition, plaintiffs counsel delivered a letter

to Mr. Merrill that stated: "If August 19th creates a problem for you, please let me know;
however, we would like to complete the deposition as soon

3

r*>>^>

4.

After receiving the Notice of Deposition and the letter, Mr. Merrill

contacted plaintiffs counsel and informed him, as he had done several times prior, that
Mr. Godfrey was out of state and would not be able to return until at least the middle of
September, 1996. Mr. Merrill explained that Mr. Godfrey's whereabouts were
confidential,1 but that he would nonetheless be available for deposition the following
month. (R. at 117, 142.)
5.

Plaintiffs counsel refused to postpone the deposition in spite of Mr.

Merrill's representation that Mr. Godfrey would be available in September, 1996. (R. at
117, 142.)
6.

On August 15, 1996, Mr. Merrill again contacted plaintiffs counsel and

explained that because his wife was prematurely in labor and hospitalized, he would not
be able to file a Motion for Protective Order before the noticed deposition date.
Plaintiffs counsel agreed to allow Mr. Merrill at least an extra week to file such a motion
or to reach some other resolution of the dispute. Plaintiffs counsel stated that, in any
event, he had already canceled the deposition arrangements for August 19. (R. at 118,
142-43.)
7.

On August 20, 1996, upon returning to work, Mr. Merrill contacted

plaintiffs counsel in an attempt to resolve the scheduling of Mr. Godfrey's deposition.

1

Mr. Godfrey was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary at the time. For a variety of
obvious personal reasons, Mr. Godfrey wanted to keep that fact as private as possible. (R. at
548, p. 13.)
4

Mr. Merrill again explained that Mr. Godfrey would not be available until at least the
middle of September 1996, but that, to provide assurances of this, 1\ It, Godfrey i \ 01 lid
agree to ^lipiiliH'11'* «i "' ,l

' ' " » ' « p i " "'

IMI

" deposition ;ii tint Iinic. sanctions would

be entered against him. No agreement, however, was reached. (R. at 118, 143.)
8

Without any further contact, plaintiffs counsel delivered a proposed

Stipulation to Mr. Merrill nil August 11. llWo

I lie Mipiiltihon proposed lti.il Mr.

Godfrey would be deposed on September 12, 1996, and that if he did not appear, both he
and The Beehive House would agree to default judgment against them. (R. at 118-19,
136-39, 143.)
9

1 Ipon receiving the proposed Stipulation, I h I Ii'i i ill lelrpliMnui plaintiffs

counsel and explained that Mr. Godfrey would not be available until September 19, 1996.
Mr. Merrill also explained that The Beehive House would not stipulate to default
judgment against it should Mr. Godfrey not appear at his deposition because The Beehive
-v.*: v

House had no control ove

' : i. • vas

otherwise agreeable, but that if these issues were not resolved, he would need to seek a
protective order. (R. at 119, 143.)
10.

On August 26, 1996, plainlitf \ counsel d d i u in d a leltei slating llul

although he would agree to depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, plaintiff would not
agree to delete from the proposed Stipulation the provision for default judgment against

5

The Beehive House in the event Mr. Godfrey did not attend his deposition. (R. at 120,
140, 144.)
11.

Upon receiving the August 26, 1996 letter, Mr. Merrill again informed

plaintiffs counsel that The Beehive House would not agree to judgment against it based
on someone else's conduct. Mr. Merrill suggested that the parties should nevertheless
proceed with Mr. Godfrey's deposition because they had finally agreed to a date, and that,
in the unlikely event Mr. Godfrey did not appear, plaintiff could then move for sanctions
against The Beehive House and allow The Beehive House an opportunity to respond. (R.
at 120, 144.)
12.

On the morning of August 28, 1996, plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to

Mr. Merrill stating that plaintiff had elected to pursue a Motion for Sanctions against both
Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House. Before Mr. Merrill was able to file a motion for a
protective order on behalf of the defendants, plaintiffs counsel served the Motion for
Sanctions on Mr. Merrill at approximately 11:00 a.m. that same day. (R. at 120-21, 144.)
13.

Despite the facts outlined above, plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was based

solely on the grounds that Mr. Godfrey did not appear at the deposition originally
scheduled for August 19, 1996 (which plaintiffs counsel himself admitted he had
canceled), and that Mr. Godfrey failed to file a motion for a protective order. (R. at 10001, 118, 142-43.)

6

In plaintiff s Motion for Sanctions and accompanying i i: lei i lorandi 11 i: i, i 10
ment :

y• <-t<

f the above-described negotiations between counsel nor of the

agreement to depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, 1996. (R. at 99-113.)
15,

On March 28, 1997, plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions came on for hearing

before the trial com t A t tl le 1 leai ii ig, tl I i ]:: arties agree d tl lat f Ii Godfre} w as available
and that his deposition would be taken forthwith. (R. at 546, pp. 2-6.) In an Order dated
April 21, 1997, the court imposed as sanctions against Mr. Godfrey the attorneys' fees
and costs plaintiff incurred in connection with the Motion i . anci i
No order was issued compelling Mr,

><lfj' • ^ m ^ t ! i L ,

)

documents, ^iv. ai 217-18.)

A copy of the court's April 21, 1997 Order is attached hereto in Addendum "B".)
16.

Thereafter, on June 4, 1997, plaintiff filed a Notice of Deposition

scheduling Mr. Godfrey's depositioi i Un 1111 \ I I I "[l < / "' 11 n N o I i a , 11 %i»\L I H H 1111 r 11 1111
deposition of B. Ralph Godfrey, a representative of The Beehive House, for July 10,
1997. The Notice requested that these deponents bring certain documents to their
depositions u to the extent such documents [were] in their possession or under their
control or [wei *;

herwise accessib j

..» i)»(

-.mr.?.

was bank

records, statements, canceled checks, etc., of The Beehive House (the "Bank Records").
(R. at 221-23.) A copy of the second Notice of Deposition is attached hereto in
Addendum "B".

;

17.

Upon receipt of the second Notice of Deposition, Mr. Godfrey and various

employees of The Beehive House searched diligently for the documents requested. Their
efforts, as more fully described in the Argument section below, included several searches
for the Bank Records of the Beehive House that had been placed in storage and
subsequently moved to different locations. (R. at 314-29.) In addition, The Beehive
House issued a subpoena to its bank, requesting copies of the Bank Records. (R. at 548,
p. 16.) Despite these efforts, The Beehive House was unable to locate the bank records
plaintiff had requested.2 (R. at 315-18.)
18.

At the appointed time on July 11, 1997, Mr. Godfrey was at the premises

where the deposition was scheduled, awaiting the instruction to come to the specific room
where the deposition was being conducted. His counsel appeared and delivered to
plaintiffs counsel all the documents Mr. Godfrey had been able to locate responsive to
the requests directed to him.3 The Beehive House also appeared with all the documents it
was able to locate. Mr. Godfrey was prepared to be sworn and deposed. Plaintiffs
counsel, however, chose not to depose Mr. Godfrey at that time, opting instead to review
the documents he had brought with him and await production of The Beehive House's
bank records before deposing Mr. Godfrey. (R. at 315, 324.)
2

During the time Mr. Godfrey was imprisoned, he exercised no control over and had
nothing to do with the documents plaintiff requested. (R. at 315, 324.)
3

At this point, Mr. Godfrey had retained the Snow, Christensen & Martineau as separate
counsel. The Beehive House was still represented by Mr. Merrill. Mr. Merrill has subsequently
withdrawn because of conflicts. The Beehive House is now represented by Dennis K. Poole.
8

ni in Ilnilll, I I [ l "' , i ', | i l , i n i l i l l Iili (III ,i M n l i i u i l o r S u n c t i o n s l o i i i i i l u i r I n M a k e

1*1

Discovery against both The Beehive House and Mr. Godfrey on the ground that they had
not produced all the documents requested. (R. at 225-26.) In response to plaintiffs
Motion, Mr. Godfrey asserted that he had in fact produced all the requested documents he
l

c •.
20.

that were in: I 1 lis possessio 1

*

M

)

'

.

This second Motion for Sanctions came on for hearing before the trial court

on September 4, 1997. (see Transcript of Hearing, R. at 548, pp. 1-42, a copy of which is
attached hereto in Addendum

e hearing, the tn

......

ff s

Motion and authorized sanctions against both defendants.
21.

In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make

Discovery, dated November 18, 1997 (the "Default Order"), the trial court struck the
pleadings of Mr. Godfrey and ei ite i ed defai ill: ji ldgi i lei it agaii ist liin l foi the following
sums: (a) $381,700.00, representing the principal amount of plaintiff s claim;
(b) $109,322.30, representing prejudgment interest through September 15, 1997; (c)
$170.00, representing plaintiffs costs; and (d) postjudgment interest on the foregoing
amounts un - •• > n full. (R at < 161 6 1 ) " cop> of tl le Defai lit Order , froi n w 1 licl l lv tr.
Godfrey appeals, is attached hereto in Addendum "B".
22.

In imposing the sanction of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey, the trial

court relied heavil;

-he assumption that it had pi e\ ioi isl> oi dei ed 1"\ li Godfrey to

produce the missing documents ;

* Godfrey was under a continuing obligation,

9

pursuant to the original Notice of Deposition filed in August 1996, to produce the records
in question. (R. at 548, pp. 28-29, 33-34.) No such order was in place, however. The
trial court had simply ordered the deposition to be rescheduled. (R. at 217-220; R. at 546,
pp. 1-10.) In addition, the August 1996 Notice of Deposition simply requested that Mr.
Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition, which did not occur and which
Plaintiffs counsel himself canceled. (R. at 86-89; 118, 142-43.)
23.

Pursuant to the trial court's Default Order, The Beehive House again

undertook to locate the documents. After extensive efforts, The Beehive House located
the documents and produced them to the plaintiff.
24.

On December 17, 1997, Mr. Godfrey filed a Notice of Appeal of the

Default 1997 Order and as to the default judgment entered against him. (R. at 465-66.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in entering the most severe sanction of default
judgment against Mr. Godfrey. First, it was improper to enter default judgment against
Mr. Godfrey for the failure of the other defendant, The Beehive House, to produce its
bank records. Mr. Godfrey did not have control over or possess the bank records; The
Beehive House did. Moreover, Mr. Godfrey produced all the documents he was able to
locate that were responsive to the requests directed to him, personally.
In addition, the trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey
was based on a number of incorrect assumptions and procedural flaws. For instance,

10

contrary to the trial court's belief, there was no prior order in place compelling Mr.
Godfrey to produce the records requested. Plaintiffs first Notice of Deposition merely
requested that Mr. Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition. Plaintiffs counsel
canceled that deposition, and there was no continuing obligation on Mr. Godfrey to
produce anything. Furthermore, at the hearing on plaintiffs first Motion for Sanctions,
the trial court did not set a specific date by which Mr. Godfrey was to produce the
requested records; rather, the court simply stated that his deposition needed to be
rescheduled, which it was. Thus, the only obligation of Mr. Godfrey was to attend his
July 11, 1997 deposition with the documents he could locate. The documents were
produced and delivered to plaintiffs counsel, and Mr. Godfrey was prepared to be sworn
in and deposed. Nonetheless, the trial court entered the most severe discovery sanction
against him. It was an abuse of discretion to do so.
ARGUMENT
"[D]efault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with
caution." Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Entry of default
judgment as a discovery sanction requires a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault,
such as the intentional failure to comply with a court order compelling discovery. See
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). Judgments by default
"are disfavored by the law," and whenever possible, cases should be decided on the
merits. Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

11

In Utah, the trial court has discretion to select which discovery sanction to impose.
That wide grant of power is abused, however, if there is "'an erroneous conclusion of law
or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Utah 1997) (citing Askew v. Hardman. 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah
1996)). In this case, for the reasons set forth below, the trial court's selection of default
judgment as a discovery sanction against Mr. Godfrey was based on several erroneous
conclusions of law, misperceptions of the evidence, and incorrect recollections of the
record. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to enter any sanction against Mr. Godfrey,
particularly the ultimate sanction of default judgment.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DEFAULTING MR. GODFREY FOR THE INABILITY OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT. THE BEEHIVE HOUSE. TO LOCATE THE
BANK RECORDS.

Default judgment should not be entered against one defendant for another
defendant's inability to timely locate requested documents.
In spite of this simple principle, in the present case, the trial court entered default
judgment against Mr. Godfrey when it was The Beehive House's bank records at issue.
These two defendants are separate. (R. at 323; R. at 548, p. 20.) At the September 4,
1997 hearing on plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, counsel for the defendants emphasized
that the bank records which had not been produced were in the "possession, custody and
control of the Beehive House"—not Mr. Godfrey. (R. at 548, p. 15.) The bank records in
question were stored and maintained by the Beehive House. In addition, throughout the
12

relevant period, Mr. Godfrey was incarcerated out of state; he obviously did not work at
The Beehive House during that time, nor did he have access to the documents at issue.
(R. at 548, pp. 17, 20.) In fact, The Beehive House, recognizing its responsibility to
locate the bank records prior to the July 11, 1997 deposition date, subpoenaed its bank for
copies of the bank statements. (R. at 548, p. 16.)
At one point during the hearing, the trial court seemed to recognize that it was the
responsibility of The Beehive House, not Mr. Godfrey, to produce the bank records. The
court stated, "All right. And at the time that the requests were made for the documents,
that the documents, whatever documents there were, were at the—under the control of the
Beehive House; isn't that correct?" (R. at 548, p. 18.) Nonetheless, in issuing its ruling,
the court explained that default would be entered against Mr. Godfrey because he had not
"requested or subpoenaed documents from the bank himself. He's relied on the Beehive
House to do his work for him." (R. at 548, p. 34.).
The court contradicted itself: The defendants were requested to produce those
documents that were within their respective possession or control; the Beehive House had
control over and maintained the Bank Records, which were in fact bank records of the
Beehive House and not of Mr. Godfrey; the Beehive House undertook to find and
produce the Bank Records; yet the court sanctioned Mr. Godfrey for relying on the
Beehive House to produce the Bank Records and for not issuing a subpoena for the
records himself.

13

The logic of the ruling is even more perplexing, and further reveals that the court
abused its discretion, in light of the court's subsequent statement. In explaining the
decision to impose attorneys fees and costs as sanctions against The Beehive House, the
trial court stated, "I'm also troubled by the fact that the Beehive House allowed a
nonemployee to search for the records, and a codefendant in the case, and have [sic] not
maintained 100 percent control over the documents in question." (R. at 548, p. 38.)
Thus, in the span of one hearing, the trial court sanctioned Mr. Godfrey for not searching
for The Beehive House's Bank Records, and then sanctioned the Beehive House for
allowing Mr. Godfrey to search for those same records. According to the trial court's
logic, no matter what the defendants did, they would be sanctioned. Defendants should
not be placed in such an impossible conundrum. This, by itself, demonstrates that the
court abused its discretion.
Mr. Godfrey was under no duty to produce the Bank Records of The Beehive
House. Rule 34 clearly indicates that a party's responsibility is to produce only those
documents in the party's "possession, custody, or control." The Bank Records were
documents pertaining solely to The Beehive House, not to Mr. Godfrey. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in sanctioning him for failing to produce them.
In Cochran Consulting. Inc. v. Uwatec USA. Inc., 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
the Federal Circuit faced a similar situation and reversed the district court's imposition of
discovery sanctions. There, Uwatec, the defendant in a patent infringement case, was

14

served with document requests seeking the computer code for the allegedly infringing
device. Uwatec did not own the code, but under threat of sanctions from the district
court, it sued Dynatec, the purported owner of the code in Switzerland in order to
establish ownership. The Swiss court ruled against Uwatec and held that Dynatec was the
sole owner of the code. In spite of this ruling, the district court in the patent litigation
imposed harsh injunctive sanctions anyway.
In reversing, the Federal Circuit explained that "[i]n imposing upon Uwatec ... the
duty to produce the [computer] code although they did not possess it and had no right to
obtain it, the district court applied incorrect legal standards." Id. at 1230. The circuit
court first reviewed Uwatec's good faith efforts to obtain and produce the code, including
filing suit against the author of the code in a foreign country. Second, the circuit court
reviewed the simple standard of Rule 34, which requires that before sanctions may be
imposed, a party must have "ownership, custody, or control" of a requested document.
"Control" is then defined "not only as possession but as the legal right to obtain the
documents requested upon demand." Id at 1229-30. Because Uwatec ultimately had no
right to the computer code, it had no ownership or control. Without such control, the
circuit court therefore held that it would be impossible for Uwatec to produce the code.
Because "Rule 37 is not a legal requirement to do the impossible," the court vacated the
sanctions.

15

The present case is similar. Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House undertook good
faith efforts to locate and produce the Bank Records. More importantly, Mr. Godfrey was
under no duty to produce those records. He lacked the legal right to obtain those
documents, upon demand, from either The Beehive House or its bank. The trial court
emphasized that fact when it reprimanded The Beehive House for allowing Mr. Godfrey
to assist in the search. The trial court also implied that Mr. Godfrey had a duty to
subpoena the Bank Records directly from The Beehive House's bank. The plaintiff could
have just as easily done this and obtained the information it sought through alternative
means. The trial court lacked the authority to compel Mr. Godfrey to produce the Bank
Records, to sanction him for failing to produce them, or to sanction him with default
judgment.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT MISPERCEIVED THE EVIDENCE
BEFORE IT: MR. GODFREY DID NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT
WARRANTING ANY SANCTIONS. LET ALONE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.

There was no factual or evidentiary basis warranting the severe sanction of default
judgment against Mr. Godfrey. He made good-faith discovery efforts and produced the
documents within his possession and control.
The type of conduct for which default judgment as a discovery sanction has been
affirmed is well illustrated in Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah
1995). In that case, the defendant failed numerous times to respo i.i to discovery requests,
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even after promising on many different occasions to comply by certain dates. The
plaintiff made several formal discovery demands, but the defendant did nothing. After
nine months of such noncompliance, the plaintiff moved to compel discovery responses.
The motion was served on the defendant, but he did not respond. Three weeks later, the
plaintiff filed a notice to submit the motion to compel for decision and a proposed order.
These documents were also served on the defendant, but he again failed to respond. The
court thus granted the motion and sent a copy of the order compelling discovery to the
defendant. Nearly seven months later, the defendant still had not answered the discovery
requests and, as a result, the plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's pleadings and enter
default. The motion, coupled with the prior order compelling discovery, was served on
the defendant, but with no response. A few weeks later, the plaintiff filed a memorandum
in support of its motion to strike, a notice to submit the motion, and a proposed order. All
of these documents were served on the defendant, but again he made no response.
Finally, over a year and a half after the initial discovery requests were served on the
defendant, default judgment was entered against him. See 892 P.2d at 5; see also Morton
v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 272-73 (Utah 1997) (describing similar
nonresponsive and dilatory tactics which provided adequate basis for entry of default
judgment as a discovery sanction).
In no manner does the conduct of Mr. Godfrey resemble that of the nonresponsive
parties in either Osguthorpe or Morton. Plaintiffs first discovery request of Mr. Godfrey
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was in the form of a Notice of Deposition, dated August 7, 1996, which requested that he
bring certain documents to his deposition scheduled for August 19, 1996. Mr. Godfrey,
however, was incarcerated in a federal prison at that time. Although plaintiff was not
informed of the reason for Mr. Godfrey's unavailability, Mr. Godfrey's counsel engaged
in good-faith negotiations with plaintiffs counsel to postpone the deposition to a
mutually feasible time. The fact that Mr. Godfrey could not be deposed in August 1996
was not concealed at all; in fact, just when it appeared that counsel for both parties had
agreed to depose Mr. Godfrey in late September of that year, plaintiff filed her first
Motion for Sanctions.
That motion was based on the fact that Mr. Godfrey was not deposed on August
19, 1996, as originally scheduled, and on the fact that Mr. Godfrey had not moved for a
protective order. The motion was indeed unexpected: not only did Mr. Godfrey's
counsel believe the parties had agreed not to pursue the August 19 deposition, but
plaintiffs counsel had expressly stated prior to that date that he had canceled the
arrangements for that deposition.
Moreover, Mr. Godfrey's counsel had stated several times that if an agreement was
not reached concerning the situation, he would need to seek a protective order. Knowing
this, plaintiffs counsel nonetheless filed the Motion for Sanctions the same morning he
notified Mr. Godfrey's counsel that he would be pursuing sanctions rather than
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continuing the negotiations. Mr. Godfrey was in effect ambushed, and had no
opportunity to seek a protective order.
While one might argue Mr. Godfrey should have allowed his whereabouts at that
time to be disclosed, it can hardly be said that he wilfully and in bad faith frustrated the
judicial process. Through his counsel, Mr. Godfrey simply sought to reschedule his
deposition to a date when he would be available, which was shortly after the deposition
date originally designated. Nonetheless, the trial court relied heavily on Mr. Godfrey's
nonappearance at the originally scheduled deposition in determining later that default
judgment against him was warranted. (R. at 548, pp. 28-29, 33-34.)
When Mr. Godfrey returned to Utah in November 1996, counsel for both parties
had agreed discovery would be postponed until after the Motion for Sanctions had been
decided. (R. at 548, pp. 19-20, 27.) The motion was argued March 28, 1997, and the
order assessing costs and attorneys' fees against Mr. Godfrey was entered April 21, 1997.
Soon thereafter, on June 4, 1997, plaintiff filed another Notice of Deposition, which
scheduled a deposition for Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House on July 11, 1997. The
Notice requested that Mr. Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition. The Notice
also requested that The Beehive House bring documents, including the Bank Records.
Pursuant to the Notice, Mr. Godfrey located and produced all the documents in his
possession or control that pertained to him personally. In addition, he helped The
Beehive House in its good-faith efforts to locate the Bank Records. Mr. Godfrey
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personally searched for the documents and instructed various employees to search
through all records and files to locate them. (R. at 323-34.)
More specifically, in the middle of June 1997, Mr. Godfrey asked DeeAnn
Schaugaard, Office Manager of The Beehive House, to locate the Bank Records. (R. at
324, 335-36.) Schaugaard earlier had placed the Bank Records in a box and moved them
to the office of Beehive Home Health, Inc., a company affiliated with The Beehive
House. (R. at 335.)
The box with the Bank Records remained at Beehive Home Health from March
1997, until approximately May 1997. (R. at 335.) Some time during May 1997, the Bank
Records and numerous other boxes of documents were moved to a storage facility.
Schaugaard, together with several others moved numerous boxes of records and
documents to the storage facility. Schaugaard taped closed the box containing the Bank
Records, affixed an identifying label, and moved the box out of the office of Beehive
Home Health. (R. at 253-55, 257, 273, 335-36.)
When Mr. Godfrey asked Schaugaard to locate the bank records in June 1997, she
was not overly concerned with immediately locating them because she assumed they
would be readily accessible at the storage facility. (R. at 336.) Prior to the end of June
1997, Schaugaard asked Ralph Godfrey to retrieve the box containing the bank records.
She described the box and its label. Ralph Godfrey however was unable to find the Bank
Records. (R. at 253-57, 273, 336.)
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Prior to the end of June 1997, Schaugaard also requested Mary Woodland, an
employee of the Beehive House, to retrieve the Bank Records. Schaugaard described the
box, but Ms. Woodland was also unable to locate it. (R. at 336.)
Shortly after that time, Schaugaard left on vacation, returning to work on July 10,
1997--the day before the records were to be produced. (R. at 336.). Mr. Godfrey
immediately requested that Schaugaard search all possible locations for the Bank
Records. (R. at 336.) Schaugaard, with the help of Mr. Godfrey and Ralph Godfrey,
searched The Beehive House, the Beehive Home Health corporate office, the storage
facility, and other locations. The search continued well into the evening of July 10, 1997.
(R. at 253-57, 273, 336.) Notwithstanding all of the foregoing efforts, the Bank Records
were not found prior to July 11, 1997.4 (R. at 337.)
These facts reveal that both Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House undertook
diligent efforts to locate the Bank Records prior to the date of the scheduled deposition,
but were simply unable to find them at that time. There is no evidence of destruction,
fraud, or purposeful concealment as is generally required to uphold entry of default
judgment as a discovery sanction. See, e.g.. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 515
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (upholding default judgment against defendant where he actively
mislead the court and the opposing party by secreting approximately $180,000 of his

4

After extensive efforts, The Beehive House subsequently located the Bank Records
and produced them to the plaintiff.
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income while insisting to the court he lacked funds to pay additional child support); see
also Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 37.50[2][b] (1998) ("[D]efault sanctions are likely to
be reversed if the failure that occasioned the sanction was inadvertent, isolated, no worse
than careless, or not a cause of serious inconvenience or prejudice.").
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, in a similar context, that as long as a
party conducts a "diligent search" for the requested documents and produces the best
evidence it can find, its inability to produce the "missing" documents is not sanctionable.
See Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies. Inc.. 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir.
1995). In the present case, the bank records had been moved twice; their precise
whereabouts were uncertain prior to the time Mr. Godfrey and others began searching for
them. Ms. Schaugaard, however, was confident that the documents could be readily
located. Employees of The Beehive House unsuccessfully searched for the documents at
various times during June 1997. When Ms. Schaugaard returned from vacation on July
10, all involved, including Mr. Godfrey, intensified the search for the bank records but
were still unsuccessful. In light of these good-faith efforts to comply with plaintiffs
requests, it was inappropriate to impose on Mr. Godfrey the extreme sanction of default
judgment.
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III.

SEVERAL SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS DEMONSTRATE
THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ENTERED AGAINST MR. GODFREY.

The ultimate discovery sanction of default judgment should not be imposed unless
the discovery requests were procedurally correct and, significantly, a prior order
compelling discovery has been entered and subsequently breached. See Rule 37(b), Utah
R. Civ. P. These prerequisites were lacking in this case, and it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to impose default judgment against Mr. Godfrey in their absence.
First and foremost, the trial court's entry of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey
as a discovery sanction was premised on the erroneous assumption that a prior order was
in place compelling Mr. Godfrey to produce the Bank Records. The trial court incorrectly
concluded that in conjunction with its Order on plaintiffs first Motion for Sanctions, it
had issued a deadline for discovery responses with which Mr. Godfrey had not complied.
At the hearing on plaintiffs second Motion for Sanctions, the trial court stated, "I set a
deadline for discovery responses in the first order, but I haven't reviewed that particular
order, but that's my practice ... Mr. Godfrey has done virtually nothing to attempt to
comply with the Court's previous order." (R. at 548, at p. 33.) The trial court did not
verify whether it had, in fact, issued such an order. Rather, the trial court, from the
bench, proceeded on its incorrect assumption and authorized default judgment against Mr.
Godfrey.
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A review of the trial court's order on the first Motion for Sanctions, and of the
transcript of the hearing on that motion, reveals that the trial court imposed no such
deadline or order. (R. at 217-220; R. at 546, pp. 1-10.) To the contrary, the trial court
ordered Mr. Godfrey to pay plaintiffs attorney fees and costs in bringing the motion,
which he paid, and simply stated that the court would "permit the deposition to be
rescheduled." (R. at 546, p. 7.) The most that can be said is that the trial court, by
implication, ordered Mr. Godfrey to appear at the rescheduled deposition. Thus, contrary
to the trial court's assumption, there was no court order in place compelling Mr. Godfrey
to produce documents.
That no such order was in place is significant: Rule 37(b) sanctions may not be
imposed unless, pursuant a preliminary discovery violation, a court order or direction is in
place compelling such discovery and such order or direction is not followed.
Two things are required as conditions precedent before the gears of the
sanction machinery of Rule 37(b) may be engaged: (1) a court order or
direction must be in effect, and (2) that order or direction must be violated.
The absence of a prior order or direction compelling discovery precludes
Rule 37(b) sanctions.
Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 37.42[1] (1998). See also Attorney General v. The Irish
People. Inc.. 684 F.2d 928, 951 n. 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied. 459 U.S. 1172
(1983) (holding that "[a] production order is generally needed to trigger Rule 37(b).");
Jamie S. Gorelick, Stephen Marzen & Lawrence Solum, Destruction of Evidence §3.4
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(1989 & Supp. 1995) ("[f]ederal court decisions ... unanimously agree that sanctions
pursuant to Rule 37 may not be awarded absent violation of a court order.").
The trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey was based
on the erroneous conclusion that he had violated a prior discovery order. That alone
provides an adequate basis for reversing the default judgment entered against Mr.
Godfrey.
In addition, the trial court relied heavily on Mr. Godfrey's alleged noncompliance
with the original Notice of Deposition in August of 1996. The facts indicate, however,
that plaintiffs counsel himself canceled that deposition date beforehand. In fact, counsel
for both parties were in the process of resolving the discovery issues, and had agreed to
depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, 1996, when plaintiff unexpectedly filed her first
Motion for Sanctions.
The trial court's ruling also incorrectly assumes that the deposition scheduled for
August 19, 1996 was properly noticed and that Mr. Godfrey failed to comply with a
proper discovery request at that time. The notice served upon Mr Godfrey's attorney was
styled "Notice of Deposition," and was dated August 7, 1996. In the notice, plaintiff
requested Mr. Godfrey to produce certain documents at the deposition, which plaintiff
scheduled for less than two weeks later, on August 19, 1996. The request was apparently
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly requires
compliance with the procedures outlined in Rule 34 (governing requests for production of
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documents), namely, that the party upon whom the request is served must be given thirty
(30) days to file a written response. Plaintiffs "Notice of Deposition" was thus deficient
on its face; it did not allow the requisite thirty days to respond. As a result, Mr. Godfrey
had no obligation to appear or produce any documents on August 19, 1996, and he had no
obligation thereafter to produce any documents, as the trial court incorrectly assumed.
In short, the trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey
was premised on erroneous conclusions of law, misconceived evidence, and incorrect
recollection of the record of the case. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to enter
default judgment as a discovery sanction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant S. Chad Godfrey respectfully requests that this
Court reverse and vacate the trial court's November 18, 1997 Default Order (Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery), as to him, and vacate the
entry of default judgment against him.
DATED t l j i s ^ J l a y of October, 1998.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

rogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance
with these rules; and the court may make orders of the
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For the purpose of
applying these rules to depositions for perpetuating testimony,
each reference therein to the court in which the action is
pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the
petition for such deposition was filed.
(4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under these rules or if, although not so taken,
it would be admissible in evidence in the courts of the state in
which it is taken, it may be used in any action involving the
same subject matter subsequently brought in any court of this
state, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 26(d) [Rule
32(a)!.'
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken from a
judgment of a district court or before the taking of an appeal
if the time therefor has not expired, the district court in which
the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of the
depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use
in the event of further proceedings in such court. In such case
the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make
a motion in the district court for leave to take the depositions,
upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was
pending in the district court. The motion shall show (1) the
names and addresses of persons to be examined and the
substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from
each; (2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the
court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to
avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order
allowing the depositions to be taken and may make orders of
the character provided for by Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon
the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner
and under the same conditions as are prescribed in these rules
for depositions taken in actions pending in the district court.
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony.
Rule 28. P e r s o n s before w h o m d e p o s i t i o n s m a y b e
taken.
(a) Within the United States. Within the United States or
within a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, depositions shall be taken before an
officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the
United States or of the place where the examination is held, or
before a person appointed by the court in which the action is
pending. A person so appointed has power to administer oaths
and take testimony. The term "officer" as used in Rules 30, 31,
and 32 includes a person appointed by the court or designated
by the parties under Rule 29.
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, depositions
may be taken (1) on notice before a person authorized to
administer oaths in the place in which the examination is
held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United
States, or (2) before a person commissioned by the court, and
a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his
commission to administer any necessary oath and take testimony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commission or a
letter rogatory shall be issued on application and notice and on
terms that are just and appropriate. It is not requisite to the
issuance of a commission or a letter rogatory that the taking of
the deposition in any other manner is impracticable or inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory may be
issued in proper cases. A notice or commission may designate
the person before whom the deposition is to be taken either by
name or descriptive title. A letter rogatory may be addressed
"To the Appropriate Authority in [here name of country]."
Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be
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excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim
transcript or that the testimony was not taken under oath or
for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the United States under these rules.
(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition shall be
taken before a person who is a relative or employee or attorney
or counsel of any of the parties, or is a relative or employee of
such attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the
action.
Rule 29. Stipulations regarding discovery procedure.
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by
written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner
and when so taken may be used like other depositions, and
(2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for other
methods of discovery.
Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination.
(a) When depositions may be taken. After commencement of
the action, any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. Leave
of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained only
if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration
of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon
any defendant or service made under Rule 4(e), except that
leave is not required (1) if a defendant has served a notice of
taking deposition or otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if
special notice is given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in Rule 45. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such
terms as the court prescribes.
(b) Notice of examination; general requirements; special
notice; non-stenographic recording; production of documents
and things; deposition of organization; deposition by telephone.
( D A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing
to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the
time and place for taking the deposition and the name and
address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the
name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify
him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. If a
subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be
examined, the designation of the materials to be produced as
set forth in the subpoena shall be attached to or included in
the notice.
(2) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a
deposition by plaintiff if the notice (A) states that the person to
be examined is about to go out of the district where the action
is pending and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or
is about to go out of the United States, or is bound on a voyage
to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless his
deposition is taken before expiration of the 30-day period, and
(B) sets forth facts to support the statement. The plaintiff's
attorney shall sign the notice, and his signature constitutes a
certification by him that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief the statement and supporting facts are
true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the
certification.
If a party shows that when he was served with notice under
this Subdivision (b)(2) he was unable through the exercise of
diligence to obtain counsel to represent him at the taking of
the deposition, the deposition may not be used against him.
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the
time for taking the deposition.
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(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may
upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be
recorded by other than stenographic means. The stipulation or
order shall designate the person before whom the deposition
shall be taken and the manner of recording, preserving, and
filing the deposition and may include other provisions to
assure that the recorded testimony will be accurate and
trustworthy. A party may arrange to have a stenographic
transcription made at his own expense. Any objections under
Subdivision (c), any changes made by the witness, his signature identifying the deposition as his own or the statement of
the officer that is required if the witness does not sign, as
provided in Subdivision (e), and the certification of the officer
required by Subdivision (f) shall be set forth in a writing to
accompany a deposition recorded by nonstenographic means.
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by
a request made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production
of documents and tangible things at the taking of the deposition. The procedure of Rule 34 shall apply to the request.
(6) A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the
deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an
association, or a governmental agency and describe with
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is
requested. In that event, the organization so named shall
designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or
other persons who consent to testify on its behalf and may set
forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will
testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty organization of its
duty to make such a designation. The persons so designated
shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to
the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does not preclude
taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these
rules.
(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may
upon motion order that a deposition be taken by telephone.
For the purposes of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and
45(d), a deposition taken by telephone is taken at the place
where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to him.
(c) Examination and cross-examination; record of examination; oath; objections. Examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the
provisions of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The officer before
whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under his
direction and in his presence record the testimony of the
witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically or
recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with
Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If requested by one of the
parties, the testimony shall be transcribed. All objections
made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of
the officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it, to
the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any
other objection to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer
upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken
subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral
examination, parties may serve written questions in a sealed
envelope on the party taking the deposition, and he shall
transmit them to the officer, who shall propound them to the
witness and record the answers verbatim.
(d) Motion to terminate or limit examination. At any time
during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a party or of
the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,
the court in which the action is pending or the court in the
district where the deposition is being taken may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from
taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of
the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If the
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order made terminates the examination, it shall be resume*
thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action
is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the timenecessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred m
relation to the motion.
.^
(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing. When the tea?
timony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted
to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by himj
unless such examination and reading are waived by the
• witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the
deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given'
by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be
signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive
the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses'
to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30,
days of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state
on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence'
of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with
the reason, if any, given therefore; and the deposition may
then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to
suppress under Rule 32(c)(4) the court holds that the reasons
given for the refusal to sign require rejection of the deposition
in whole or in part.
•;
(D Record of deposition; certification and delivery by officer;
exhibits; copies.
. 7:
(1) The transcript or other recording of the deposition made
in accordance with this rule shall be the record of the deposition. The officer shall sign a certificate, to accompany the
record of the deposition, that it was duly sworn and that it is
a true record of the testimony given by the witness. Unless
otherwise ordered by the court, the officer shall securely seal
the record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the
title of the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert name
of witness]" and shall promptly send the sealed record of the
deposition to the attorney who arranged for the transcript or
other record to be made. If any party in the action is not
represented by an attorney, the record of the deposition shall
be sent to the clerk of the court for filing unless otherwise
ordered by the court. An attorney receiving the record of the
deposition shall store it under conditions that will protect it
against loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration.
(2) Documents and things produced for inspection during
the examination of the witness shall, upon the request of a
party, be marked for identification and annexed to the record
of the deposition and may be inspected and copied by any
party, except that if the person producing the materials
desires to retain them that person may (A) offer copies to be
marked for identification and annexed to the record of the
deposition and to serve thereafter as originals, if the person
affords to all parties fair opportunity to verify the copies by
comparison with the originals, or (B) offer the originals to be
marked for identification, after giving to each party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the originals
may be used in the same manner as if annexed to the record of
the deposition. Any party may move for an order that the
originals be annexed to and returned with the record of the
deposition to the court, pending final disposition of the case.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by the
parties, the officer shall retain stenographic notes of any
depositions taken stenographically or a copy of the recording
of any deposition taken by another method. Upon payment of
reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of
the record of the deposition to any party or to the deponent.
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses.
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition
fails to attend and proceed therewith and another party
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(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and
irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed,
endorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the
officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a motion to
suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with
reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due
diligence might have been, ascertained.
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under
Subsection (a) of this rule shall have the effect of publishing
the deposition unless the court orders otherwise in response to
objections.
Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties.
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve
upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered
by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental
agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Interrogatories may,
without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after
commencement of the action and upon any other party with or
after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully
in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event
the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer.
The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and
the objections signed by the attorney making them. The party
upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a
copy of the answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after
the service of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may
serve answers or objections within 45 days after service of the
summons and complaint upon that defendant. The court may
allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an
interrogatory.
(b) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the Rules of
Evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact, but the court may order that such an
interrogatory need not be answered until after designated
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or
other later time.
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to
an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the
business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory
has been served or from an examination, audit, or inspection
of such business records, including a compilation, abstract, or
summary thereof and the burden of deriving or ascertaining
the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the
interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer
to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the
answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the
party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to
examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies,
compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A specification shall be
in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate
and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records
from which the answer may be ascertained.
Rule 34. Production of documents and things and entry
upon land for inspection and other purposes.
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request

698

(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or
someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any desig-nated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs,
charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if
necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into
reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample
any tangible things • which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession,
custody or control of the party upon whom the request is
served; or
(2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property
in the possession or control of the party upon whom the
request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring,
surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or
any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of
Rule 26(b).
(b) Procedure. The request may, without leave of court, be
served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action
and upon any other party with or after service of the summons
and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the*
items to be inspected either by individual item or by category,
and describe each item and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and
manner of making the inspection and performing the related
acts.
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a
written response within 30 days after the service of the
request, except that a defendant may serve a response within
45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The
response shall state, with respect to each item or category,
that inspection and related activities will be permitted as
requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event the
reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to
part of an item or category, the part shall be specified. The
party submitting the request may move for an order under
Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to
respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to
permit inspection as requested.
(c) Persons not parties. This rule does not preclude an
independent action against a person not a party for production
of documents and things and permission to enter upon land.
Rule 35. P h y s i c a l and mental e x a m i n a t i o n of persons.
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical
condition (including the blood group) of a party or of a person
in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order the party or person to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to
produce for examination the person in the party's custody or
legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good
cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and
to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made.
(b) Report of examining physician.
(1) If requested by a party against whom an order is made
under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing
the examination to be made shall deliver to the person
examined and/or the other party a copy of a detailed written
report of the examiner setting out the examiner's findings,
including results of all tests made, diagnosis and conclusions,
together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the
same condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party
against whom the order is made a like report of any exami-
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nation, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition,
unless, in the case of a report of examination of a person not a
party, the party shows that the report cannot be obtained. The
court on motion may order delivery of a report on such terms
as are just, and if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report
the court may exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at
the trial.
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination
so ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the
party examined waives any privilege the party may have in
that action or any other involving the same controversy,
regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine the party in respect of the
same mental or physical condition.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by
agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly
provides otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of any other examiner or the taking of a
deposition of an examiner in accordance with the provisions of
any other rule.
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At the
time of making an order to submit to an examination under
Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon motion of the
party to be examined, order the party seeking such examination to furnish to the party to be examined a report of any
examination previously made or medical treatment previously
given by any examiner employed directly or indirectly by the
party seeking the order for a physical or mental examination,
or at whose instance or request such medical examination or
treatment has previously been conducted. If the party seeking
the examination refuses to deliver such report, the court on
motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on
such terms as are just; and if an examiner fails or refuses to
make such a report the court may exclude the examiner's
testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other order
as is authorized under Rule 37.
Rule 36. R e q u e s t for a d m i s s i o n .
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any
other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may
allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after
service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within
thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter
or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit
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or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or
readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit
or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an
admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or
set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
The party who has requested the admissions may move to
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall
order that an answer be served. If the court determines that
an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule,
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these
orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made
at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject
to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other
proceeding.
Rule 37. F a i l u r e to m a k e or c o o p e r a t e in discovery;
sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as
follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party
may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on
matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken. An application for an
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted
under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for
inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order
compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the
question may complete or adjourn the examination before he
applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may
make such protective order as it would have been empowered
to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
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(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this
subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as
a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted,
the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the
party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or
the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court
finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the" court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the
motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in
opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court
finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court
may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to
the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken.
If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the
deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a
contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of
a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule
26(f), the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to
obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under
Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination,
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is
unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,
the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or
the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document
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or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable,
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4)
there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve
answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection.
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party
or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify
on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is
to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submit-,
ted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories,
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request,
the court in which the action is pending on motion may make,
such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any
order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party
failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective
order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan..
If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing,
require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party t h e
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the
failure.
PART VI. TRIALS
R u l e 38. J u r y t r i a l of r i g h t .
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by
the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to
the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and
not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a
pleading of the party.
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may
specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall
be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so
triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the
issues, any other party, within 10 days after service of the
demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve
a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of
fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to
serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
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Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793)
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY M. TUCK,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

vs.
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an
individual,
Defendants.

1S0107 1

Case No. 950908242CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

TO THE DEFENDANTS, S. CHAD GODFREY AND THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, AND
THEIR COUNSEL:
Notice is hereby given that the deposition of S. Chad Godfrey in the above-entitled
action will be taken before a certified shorthand reporter at the offices of Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on Monday, August 19, 1996 commencing at 10:00 a.m.
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant
Godfrey is requested to bring with him the following documents to his deposition:
1.

All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what disposition

The Beehhe House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds paid by plaintiff Mary M. Tuck
through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11.
2-

Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers, accounting records,

or other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition which S. Chad
Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by means of the checks
attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11.
3.

Any and all contracts, letters of intent, memoranda of understanding or

other written agreements (or written memoranda of verbal agreements) between plaintiff and
The Beehive House and/or S. Chad Godfrey.
4.

Any copies of the Policies and Procedures of The Beehive House bearing

plaintiffs signature.

180107 1

5.

Copies of any and all notices to pay or quit, notices of delinquency, or

other written communication whether between S. Chad Godfrey and/or The Beehive House,
and plaintiff, in connection with plaintiffs alleged failure to pay rent as set out at paragraph
6 of your counterclaim herein.
6.

Copies of any billings, accountings, or itemizations, or other documents of

whatever nature setting out the services and tasks performed on plaintiffs behalf by S. Chad
Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, as set out at paragraph 9 of the counterclaim.
DATED this V^

day of August, 1996.
JONES, WALDO, IIOLBRPOK &
MCDONOUGH

Vincenj^ Rampton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _J

day of August, 1996, I caused to be hand

delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF DEPOSITION, to the
following:
Brad W. Merrill
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793)
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & Md)ON( >UGII
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
j
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
V
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^ V - ^ - ^ 7 - if; 0 \ CAS>^

MARY M. TUCK,

vs.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO
ATTEND DEPOSITION AND
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an
individual,

Case No. 950908242CN

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Attend Deposition, and
defendants' Motion for Protective Order, in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
before the Court on Friday, March 28, 1997, at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by his
counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
Defendant S. Chad Godrey was represented by his counsel of record, Kim R. Wilson of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Defendant Beehive House was represented by its counsel
of record, David M. McGrath of Parry, Murray & Ward.

The Court having reviewed the moving papers and submittals of the
parties, having heard oral argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is granted to the extent

hereinafter stated as to defendant S. Chad Godfrey only.
2.

Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is denied.

3.

Defendant S. Chad Godfrey is ordered to pay to plaintiff's

counsel the sum of $

M ^ 5~. —^

, representing plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees

incurred in the filing and arguing of its Motion for Sanctions, and in defending against
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Said sum shall be paid on or before May 1, 1997.
4.

In the event that sanctions are paid, in the amount and by the

time specified above, the parties shall thereafter schedule the deposition of S. Chad Godfrey
at a time and place agreeable to counsel.
DATED this ^ l ^ d a y of April, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Anne M. Stirba
Third District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

•JbL

firad W. Merrill, Esq.
Attorney for The Beehive House

APPROVED AS

Attorney forNS. Chad Godfrey
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the eg"

day of April, 1997, I caused to be transmitted via

telefax, and mailed via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing form of ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE
TO ATTEND DEPOSITION AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
to the following:
Brad W. Merrill, Esq.
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Kim R. Wilson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place #1100
/
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/'
/

/
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Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793)
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

^A--

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

MARY M. TUCK,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

vs.

THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an
individual,
Defendants.

218100 1

Case No. 950908242CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

l

/

TO THE DEFENDANTS, S. CHAD GODFREY AND THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, AND
THEIR COUNSEL:
Notice is hereby given that the depositions of Ralph Godfrey and S. Chad Godfrey
in the above-entitled action will be taken before a certified shorthand reporter at the offices
of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the dates and at the times indicated below:
1.

Ralph Godfrey - Thursday, July 10, 1997 at 10:00 a.m.

2.

S. Chad Godfrey - Friday, July 11, 1997 at 10:00 a.m.

Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, deponents are
requested to bring with them the following documents to their depositions, to the extent such
documents are in their possession or under their control or otherwise accessible to them:
1.

All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what disposition

The Beehive House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds p/.id by plaintiff Mary M. Tuck
through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11.
2.

Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers, accounting records,

or other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition which S. Chad
Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by means of the checks
attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11.
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3.

Any and all contracts, letters of intent, .xiemoranda of understanding or

other written agreements (or written memoranda of verbal agreements) between plaintiff and
The Beehive House and/or S. Chad Godfrey.
4.

Any copies of the Policies and Procedures of The Beehive House bearing

plaintiffs signature.
5.

Copies of any and all notices to pay or quit, notices of delinquency, or

other written communication whether between S. Chad Godfrey and/or The Beehive House,
and plaintiff, in connection with plaintiffs alleged failure to pay rent as set out at paragraph
6 of your counterclaim herein.
6.

Copies of any billings, accountings, or itemizations, or other documents of

whatever nature setting out the services and tasks performed on plaintiffs behalf by S. Chad
Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, as set out at paragraph 9 of the counterclaim.
DATED this 1 ^

day of June, 1997.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
7
MCDONOUGH
"

Via^St C. Rampton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the JJ*

day of June, 1997, I caused to be hand

delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF DEPOSITION, to the
following:
Brad W. Merrill
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kim R. Wilson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/
/

/

/
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Third Judicial District
Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793)
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & M nONOUGH
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOV 18,1997
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2. 2.11<^7
MARY M TUCK,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO
MAKE DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an
individual.

Case No. 950908242CN
Jud^e Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery in the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the Court on Thursday, September 4, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record, Vincent L. Rampton of Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough. Defendant S. Chad Godfrey was represented by his counsel of
record, David L. Pinkston of Snow, Christensen & Martineau

Defendant Beehive House

was represented by its counsel of record, Brad W. Merrill of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green &
MacRae
The Court reviewed the moving papers and submittals of the parties, heard oral
argument of counsel, and stated a bench ruling granting plaintiffs motion as set out herein.

Plaintiffs counsel submitted a form of order accompanied by an affidavit of attorney's fees,
to which defendant Beehive House registered an objection, resulting in a hearing held on
November 14, 1997. The court having heard argument on the objection filed by defendant
Beehive House, having reviewed the affidavit of plaintiffs counsel, being fully advised in the
premises, finding hereby that final judgment as set out herein may and should be entered,
there being no just cause for delay, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is granted as to defendant S. Chad Godfrey.

2.

The pleadings of S. Chad Godfrey herein are stricken, and judgment by

default is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff Estate of Mary Tuck, and against defendant S.
Chad Godfrey, as prayed in plaintiffs complaint, as follows:
a.

$381,700.00, representing the principal amount of plaintiffs claim

b.

$109,322.30, representing prejudgment interest on plaintiffs' principal

herein;

claim at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum accrued through September 15, 1997;
c.

$170.00, representing plaintiffs costs herein; and

d.

Interest on the foregoing at the postjudgment rate from September 15,

1997 until paid in full.
The foregoing order shall constitute entry of a final judgment under Rule 54, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, there being no just cause for delay.
3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions against defendant Beehive House is granted in

part and taken under advisement in part, as follows:
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a.

Defendant Beehive House shall pay to plaintiff, on or before the fifth

(5th) day following entry of this Order , ft le si n n of $1 ,600.00, representing plaintiff's .
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in pursuing this Motion for Sanctions;
b.

On or before September

defendant Beehive House shall

produce the following documents to plaintiffs counsel:
(1)

All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what

disposition The Beehive House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds paid by plaintiff Mary M.
Tuck through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11;
and
(2)

Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers,

accounting records, cr other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition
which S. Chad Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by
means of the checks attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11.
In the event the Beehive House is unable to locate and produce said documents, defendant the
Beehive House shall, on or before September 15, 1997, produce reasonable evidence that it
can obtain copies of said documents from its bank or other sources.
4

In the event defendant Beehive House does not make payment as prescribed

herein, and/or fails to produce documents as set out above, the Court will entertain a renewal
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of plaintiff's motion to strike the pleadings of defendant Beehive House and enter judgment
against it as prayed in plaintiff's complaint herein.
DATED this ( f t ^ d a y of November, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Anne M. Stirba
Third District Court Judge
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A P P E A R A N C E S
For the

Plaintiff:

Vincent Hampton
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

This is the matcer c:

versus Beehive House, Case No. S50908242.
the time set for argument

on the motion

T:

for

sanctions.
Counsel, would you state your sti

es:a:e

or

.-:arv

15!

.nK vou
- ir v_ O - l

18

•carrey

IS

- n n

L

o U^ l

i

:ia:.rx

20

Counsel.

21

familiar with the case because

22

first

23

feel well informed

v

-

r

^

I have read all of the pleadings.

time they sent a motion

background

"V /• /~N 1 1

this is not the
for sanctions.

of the background

involved here.

And

I am

and

And

factual

1 will tell you th;

I think that there is no auestion

that there

-- i:

Pace 4

my mind, at this point, that sanctions
appropriate.

The question
And before

I'd

is, what
ordered

are

sanctions?
attorney's

and costs to be paid, and that approximately
$1,000, and so the question
the appropriate
K = Q p. ;

jn

in my mind is:

sanction here?

Because

is
vrhat

clearly

the facts that have been presented

there has been failure

f*

in

to - - v: e 11 , to

i n v: n i

L.

20

p 1 eadi:

2 11

tnt i o n

- - a '«_

22

itself, then you can feel free to do so, or if you

23

think that something has been overlooked

2 4i

heard my comments here this

morning.

understanding, you may proceed.

Mr.

as you've

Page

-1

MR. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, as a

r.atter, v; e received on the
Aucrus t

an affidavit

2 9th

of S. Chad Godfrey.

dered that ail submittals
p> v"

*~\ o

•": *";

evening

place by July 29th.

7

in this

Ke believe it

d ask that it be stricken.
Z'r.E CCURT :

Whi ch matte r was r e ce i v

.A:-:?TON:
—

^ c

explained

t c n i m i n t v.* o c. i z z e r e n t c i t i e s
2 0!

France and one in Italy.

2 1;

find anyone

2 21

the

Kr. Godfrey was unable

in Italy who was willing

to notarize

affidavit.

2 3|
24

i n z. u r c c e , o n e i n

Apparently
bureaucratic

it's kind of a lengthy

process to get something notarized i:

j

2 5!

that country and he simply wasn't

able to get it

Pace 6

notarized

. returnea to us.
•pon his return to the country, we :

it

sianea

[ notarized
realize

our.5 e 1 .

and filed and

that you or the Court v;as

on being opposed
' v-

/-> V~\
V_/ » W

V-V
r*> v~\
«^

delivered

- - that the deadl:

the motion was the 2 S t h of - - excui

.,
>

: e 27th or 2Sth of July.
.~

v; a s
.-

O - V - X w ^ ,

2 G!

I

r

L. - C ^

cxIlU

A

1 o-

Cur ~otic:

b - : . ^

i ; c; r J .

:

^

ordeal.
THE COURT:

2 2|

certainly

2 31

the circumstances, I'll
strike.

I wouldn't

know but

take your representation.
not grant

I think u n d•

the notion

Where there's no prejudice, I

to -- for this to be unduly

I'll

technical.

L \^>

J, -

W

to

Page 7

memoranda were to be submitted,
course, any affidavit

that conflicts, of

that was before.

Given the

practical problems here, I WT i 11 consider
affidavit.

the

(Inaudible) to the plaintiff.
MR. RAM F T ON:

Thanks, Your Honor.

Based on the Court's opening observations
matter,

I'm going to address myself

have directly
appropriate

in this

in the time we

to the nature of sanctions w h i c h are

in this matter.
First of all, a couple of facts
-r
r e a since our

r^ ' — ~ :

that

- i i c i

a z z i aav

— .;

o:

;N :
is
• ^

K

auua:
k

^

^

:

e,

v- .3 "-• r> •

eeoer

estaoiisnmg

scrr

Q

T.*

»~ -i r* '

\-, — — ^_

The Court

is reminded

that we asked

for

the bank records which are now the subject of this
motion, first

in August of 1996.

We've been

trying

to get them for over a year.
At that time, according
Skougard's

to Mrs.

affidavit, those records were being

regularly kept, regularly

compiled and

regularly

Page 6

placed

in a labeled box of which she had

custody and knew exactly where
^j

it was.

.ailed to appear for his

persona]
v:hen y.i* .

deposition

r s t time, those had already been rr. a d e the
subject of cur request

for production

House was well aware that we exoected

-

1 S;
1 9i

and Beehivthem to be

Q

L- w - - v C i i .

20

t n e s u o j e c z or written aisccvery

21j

a year and was identifiable

22|

location

23

first made has now suddenly vanished

24

Godfrey

requests

r o r ever

and known as to its

and contents at the time the request

was

now that X r.

is back.
All

1 can say is that's a convenient

Page 9

situation but I don't know the
circumstances.
don't

actual

However, the actual

change the plight

that I'm

circumstances

nov; in.

This

casi

has from the beginning been about what happened to
51

this m c n e y .

W e k n ow they got it, w e know they got

the checks that were labeled

leans or investments,

we knov; that they didn't pay it back.

v" f\ *n *~

taken,

What

r^- •

di v

.a t ' s unf or t'
. sn' t it

kJ-^XZll

. £3

1 sccve r

L

19

I really

20|

have no facts to do that.

21

that

I'm

don't

-- by

nov; without

the

nature

Now, proposing

23

THE COURT:

2 5j

of your

of

si t ua ti c

that

I need

--

Are those documents

position?
MR. RAMPTON:

the

But the fact remain:

the documents

22

24

o v; ana

Pardon?

as

Da
Page
10

THE COURT:
as part cf your
KR.

Do you have your

documents

position?
RAKPTON:

Concerning

-- well, no,

that's not exactly true.

Concerning

the

disposition

of funds, I have no documents

establish

that.

exception

c f certain records which were

I have no bank records, with the

to my office at 4:30

• L :. i

the

delivered

yesterday' afternoon.

Cppc s in

-L :;

evidence

but

to

en

bank

m. o n e \* v«' e n t

know what

tne

race

statements
.o e o a u s e

L.

tne

can.-;

don't

nere

statements

tell

are

no

me

where

c n e c ."; s

the
i oon

t

they did with it.
I'm

in the same position

filed this action.
that money,
even pled

or

Depending

I was when we

on what happened

I may have causes of action

in this case yet.

filling cut the pleadings

We're

stage.

to

I haven't

still
And now

i \ r ' v" ~
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t e they've

lost the records and so we' II

.ever kncv: exactly what happened.
:

And yet, the

e e h i v e House has taken the position

that they have

. o responsibility because Chad Godfrey put the
have
£!

ion' t

done

wi:

loo
lon't

have

asking
rverely

^

start

IS

something

w *.

for

adequate
from

records,

the

prejudiced

in

beg i nn i
this

;_

t= ** ^ c .

{Inaudible)?

20

MR. y.ERRILL:

Your Honor, let me take

2 1]

issue with a couple of points made by Kr . Rarr.pton

22J

and I too will direct my comments based

2 31

(Inaudible)
Court's

upon

indications prior to argument

inclined

to make

that the

sanctions.

If that's the Court's

inclination, it';
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our position that at a minimum default
appropriate, sanction
problem.
•p -;

~

for this particular

And that at most, the

.cial sanctions

discovery

(Inaudible)

entered

The first
Hampton

is not an

item that I dispute

is that there have been no disputes

the beginning

of this litigation

certain accounts.

these

We've had documentation

he cime the comolaint

since

that the money

that was paid to Chad Godfrey v:ent into

z rcrr

from Mr.

v:as filed.

of that

The

cr.ezks

.c .
• ^

iQ c^z .^. . b

i_o

J^~

c i s c c v e rv

U ii L O U v

"I

Godfrey
v; r.

_

_

_»

and

«_

V-N

Cha

Goarre y

aei

she expected

^ -. t: c; -

o n -. y .

. J. c a ^ c<

Chad to pay it back.
There's also been affidavit

in the case that she's
to other people

- - that Mary Tuck

that she did not believe

testimony
indicated
she lent

any of that money to the Beehive House itself.
so at the beginning

of this case, much of the

discovery was focused upon Chad Godfrey.

And I

And

Page

iers t ai i U
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C
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:ourt's concern and Mr. Ramoten's

time, and that's not

disputed.

One of the things that
issue with, however, is that

I would

take

I don't believe

61

some of the discovery problems are entirely

7j

fault of defendants.

8;

while

that
the

In this case, it took quire

for an initial discovery

action or request

Ana tnat w:
last, it was fecuse;

— ^ — _ ex

Q

-L

.=. rr <' -. ^ '

v; nere.
:uns e i r or

19

___

20

obligated

21

the Court was displeased by that and did not

22

appreciate Mr. Godfrey not disclosing

23

whereabouts.

24

sanctions was filed, an initial motion

r^

-^

*-

f

s tne aecision ne maae, ana _ was
to go with that.

And

I understood t hat

his

And as a result, a motion

sanctions, and sanctions were entered

for
for

aqair.st

Pace 14

-rey
I believe
s u rrcui

that the

circumstances

ing the present motion

for sanctions

ccmoiete ly different.

Discovery

. e a :cr epositions

requests

were

for Chad Godfrey and for

The first request

d ^ ^ ~ v n

are

for a deposition

ci an err.c-- 1/^0 of tz. h e Beehive House v/ a s the
icr. request

for Ralph Godfrey.

At

that

I s : Chad Gcdfrev v:as nov: v:cr>:ino for :he

- ^ i -; v

laucinc
Locum;

IS
2 01
21

tneir Qsoosition

c ^ ^' c:

o testify.
determination

Plaintiff's

S

I ^ C J

as noticeo

counsel made

orecarec

the

that it did not to want to orcceed

22j

with the deposition because

23

there.

24

that regard.

~ V ~
the documents v;er

V-. /

-

I'm not going to question his decision o:
Documents were produced

at that

Page 15

THE COURT:

But not near

that could be considered
MR. MERRILL:
acknowledge

--

(Inaudible)

full and complete.
And I certainly

that, Your Honor.

But

- - and the Rules

of Civil Procedure are clear, that a party
Rule 34 is responsible
possession,

under

to produce documents

in its

custody and control.
Nov;, I don't dispute

that

those

at a time were in cos s e s s ion , ousted'/ and
. ve - n :: c

P

.a L

located

v; h e r e

double-checked

the y
it,

th ought

a c/ ^ '

the y

. rs

v; e r e ,

triple-checked

subpoena upon the bank to produce

it.

v; e
We

served

a

at least the b a n•

statements because we knew we had those.
Mr. Rampton contends
prove his case because

that he can't

there's no

documents

available, we've taken them, and certainly
that they've been intentionally
don't

-- obviously,

implied

taken, which I

there's no evidence of that.
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Nov;, I - - I do not see the merit of
that argument

for a couple of reasons.

First of

all, the bank documents can be recovered.
recovered

the bank statements, we can

which checks that Kr. Rampton would

We've

determine

like to produce

and either he can pursue a subpoena or we can to
recover these checks.
Obviously,
else had desired

"_:

believe

IT

if Mr. Godfrey or anybody

to intentionally

p — 77 H T •

that a subpoena

dispose of

JL "! "*• r i C '"^ ""

ID O

to the bank would

v Or

I* ** ^, */t*

not

produce every b a nk i n g record that we - THE COURT:

V7 e 11

zzr.a

w h v haver.' t: v c u

/< e a i a a o a s u o p o e n a to
request

the bank statements.

cancelled
of

that

We did not

request

checks because of the voluminous

nature

••

THE COURT:

All right.

Go ahead,

I'll

wait until you're done.
MR. MERRILL:

My feeling en that, Your

Page 17

Honor, was that once we got the bank statements, we
could determine

if there were specific

checks

were relevant or at issue, that we could
request

then

those specific checks.
~KE COURT:

this?

that

(Inaudible)

talking

This was already, as I recall, the

about

subject

irst Met ion to Comoel, was it not?

tion to Comeel dec
. o attend r.:s a e:
>ar rev

GIG

r.<
V_ ... d

U

iov ee

correc t'?
:ERR:LL
^ -

w

-' t- Vi

w ^ ^ C — ^ — W .i

THE COURT:

At any time, was he the

employee of the Beehive House?
KR. KERRILL:
THE COURT:
MR. MERRILL:
emo i ovee

Chad

Godfrey.

During what time
Any time

period?

period.

Yes, he has been an

THE COURT:

Okay.

And at what t Ir-

an d if I understood Mr. Rampten correctly, he
saying that the records were available
Beehive House according
bookkeeper

at the

to the Skougard,

the

at the Beehive House.
MR. MERRILL:

I believe

that's

cor

our n o:
-n —

J ^cb

v

^ <s u .v i

All

_ ^

- v- -

were mace r >
r*

,"> *~* i

V V

•v- -

the documents v:as located

r*

•

at the Beehive

Hcus:

v: i:hin the p o w e r of the Beehive House to make
available

or photocopy

--

MR. M E R RIL L:

I don't know if

that's -THE COURT:
discovery

-- or in response

to a

request made in August of last year.

Pace IS

MR. MERRILL:
entirely correct

I don't know if that's

for a couple of reasons.

first reason was the discovery

request

The

in August

was for Chad Godfrey and Chad did not make an
effort, at least that I'm

aware of, because he d:

not plan on attending his deposition.
to chose to not appear, although
ZKZ

COURT:

^ ^

ibi
19

i n z.
discovery

20

L, u

.

_

--

Wasn't he incarcerated -

VR. MERRILL:

„ „ I

He electee

,

u xi :

He was

„

.

A

11

,

.

incarcerated;

,

rignt .

v, n e n w a s

request made on the Beehive
MR. MERRILL:

I believe

tne

House?

there was an

21

initial notice of deposition served

for Ralph

22

Godfrey

23

through discussions with counsel, it was determine;

24

that that would be continued until after the motic:

2 51

for sanctions had been decided,

in November - December of last year.

the

original

And

Pace 20

notion,
issued

after the motion for sanctions was
THE COURT:

entered.

But you're telling me that

e ven zh ouch the Beehive House had t h e box of
documents

in August of 19 96 and the lawsuit

was

o e n d i n a, and the Beehive House was cart of it at
erne n c w tr.at

w *i CX U

:x or
Q O ?

. tr c• 1 of the

w

i

inCcil

(

^ e : l cx^. — U

— -^ r) 1 r ^ . r s ;

19
20

in e cis c o v e r y was rocusec t c

21!

He was unable

22|

as a result, although M s . Skougard believed

23|

affidavit

2 41

that the documents

to comply, elected not

to
in he:

that was filed for this motion, believed
at that point were

she looked at that ooin;

available,

Page 21

there's no way to know whether they were
were.
. a L L b

w :xa

In fact, I think one of t

he rr.akes aware in her affidavit i £>

w -* a

u

that the documents are all where s h ,
5;

zh o u g h t

i

problem

6|
1

so,

would be and didn't think there'
.c

as>:

-. ocate

then.

And she made

bunch of people

efforts

to lock for them

u1d n' t find then.
- n z,

I

^ ~ ^^ 1 I
_.*_*.

V d

rtii
li O

^* w W

.e

.„- ,

^

— S^ d

^

<_

— - -

en

° ~ - j

19

it

in

July?

20|

y.R. XERRILL:

Well, that's an

21 -

interesting

question, Your Honor, and it probably

2 2j

has a number of answers.

23

that have been filed, they first began looking

Based upon the

affidavits
for

i

24

that box in mid-June.

And from what we understand,

bK c u g a r a air e c t e a some
c i..u . o y c c :

.c co ce:

Page 22

places where she thought the box could be
for.

They reported

to her they didn't

there, they weren't able to find it.
Well,

see it
She

says,

it's got to be there.
And eventually,

6|

looked

in the beginning of

July, after she had been gone on vacation

and so:

other oersor.al leave, she went and looked,
Gunnc

c ec c _e were

i.. ^

* i ^

i.

a

ne

to your zu e szic n

i

,

i j- t n e o a"

una i

10th and
^ c c >: m c

19
20
21

cox
THE COURT:
.nswer filed?

All

right,

And is there a counterclaim?

MR. MERRILL:

23

THE COURT:

2 51

11th.

. o see ii tney

22

24

wr.oie cerica c:

miss

v_ .. tr

she

.nswer and counterclaim
MR. MERRILL:

There is.
All right.

When was you:

filed?
I believe

it was

filed

Pace 23

! a r c n or

9 6.
THE COURT:

± u^

i

lay 13 of
4!

'96 and that answer and counterclaim

was

ilea
y.R . y.ERRI LL :
r. o n o r

I

don't

have

That nay be correct, Your

that

file

'hen

T

; :;KSTON

with

was

f-

- :: a ^

y.r . Gc

v p u ' c;

*- "U

Qis

r*
u^ -

16!
'Or:-

V T "Z 7? T T

IS
20

ny clients

were

L-

v n v v-

ca. r*.

JL

a at that point was thai

ii

2 1!

the money was loaned to Chad Godfrey, that he coul<

22

do whatever he wanted with it.

23

in the Beehive House account, it was his money to

24

do that with.

If he deposited

it

But it was loaned to hin, the

checks were made out to him, the checks

indicated

Pace 24

they were leaned to him.

And for futu:

• very, a deposition with Ma r y Tuck

z!

indi;

.he - - where
£i

w as

t'.

coma
d not believe, based upon tht

6i

' o r t h in the answer

alleaaz.

kt

and

the r;cney was ever inter.de:

:use by Mary Tuck, and she r.e'

: on re :

1 S|
2 01

MR. PINKSTON:
In listening
Merrill

the Court's questioning

and Mr. Rarr.pton, I sense the

22|

concern that the request

23|

place since August of
from the Court

Zz\

Thank you, Your Honor.
of both Xr.
Court's

for documents has been i:

'96 and the concern

is that why didn't

I sense

somebody

scmethino while the documents were still

do

sittina
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tr.ere in tne

cmce.
THE COURT:

A concern, yes.

MR. PINKSTON:
Court's concerns.

And this would be cur --

THE COURT:
talk about

following

first Motion
related

Yes, it is one of the

Well, and we would

also

the order and granting

to Compel, although

the

I understand

it

to the deposition but it also had to do
the product

PIXKSTCN:

c-i-i.^. — — ^_

'i oc;

Mr.

Merrill

Godfrey's

MR.

PINKSTON

has

represented

rationale

to

the

Court,

for so doing.

When Mr. Godfrey returned
of

in November

'S6, I suppose we could say, well, why

you gather up the documents at that point
return them?

Mr.

didn't
and

The only explanation, Your Honor, is

that upon his return to work,

J.

JLuLcH
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c:r.<

things that he wanted
c

to take care of, m a k <

rat-r^l

ployment was secure, ]us'

en his feet and get things going.

It r.ay simply be

a case of out of sight out of mind, upon his
from prison back to normal

return

life.

The second recuest was issued
of this year, as is set forth in the af:

in June

1 G aV 1t

testimony, when the notice of depesitic:
i c v e e s or
.o

.cc o r

locate
.•. a v

.^^e

"^

' *~> ^

i<3^^;iUi>

r-\ O

were

V" ;

it d r i v e

a w a v , s'r.;\ n a t s t e o s a i a
-s e rec!

KR
Skougard

PIXKSTON:

•H ^ ?

He instructed

De anne

to look for the records as soon as he - THE COURT:

Well, he was no longer an

employee of Beehive, so he made a phone

call,

called her up and said, would you look for
documents, something

to that

MR. FINKSTON:

these

effect?

That's correct.

I'm no'
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sure whether

it was a phone call or whether it was

a face-tc-face
Skougard

discussion, but he asked

Deanne

to look for those records.
As Ms. Skougard
THE COURT:

indicates

she - -

And he did that

MR. ?INKSTON:

when?

That would have been :h-

r.icdle cf June, upon receipt of the notice of

Oka v
i s s u e c c r a n 11 n c

«-

here.

i

~.

Let's see, March 28, '97, so that's when the

oral argument was held, the first Motion to Compel,
and the order on that was entered en April 2 0th.
And so he waited until June to begin
the

looking

for

documents?
MR. PINKSTON:

notice of deposition.

Upon receipt of the

That's our

understanding,

Pace

rour

23

r.onor

recoras

at

issue

Beehive House.

in t i n s

notion

are

tne

v^. ^

O

—

in

all of :he

in his control, custody or possession

: sD onsi ve

t:

•w.:: w

Godfrey produced
be sv:cm

. V_y _

At the time of the deposition

July of this year, Mr. Godfrey produced
documents

re

i

c

cuest tnat r e i a u e a to

mm

those documents, was available

in and participated

v.* a i t i n cr for the

in his

to

deposition.

documents?

11 o n

recues'
: a. ^ w'

requiring
which

L-

v_ ,

him to pay attorney's

I understand

the discovery, and

fees and costs,

he did, for failing

to produce

(Inaudible) deposition.

-- there's the order on that on April

20.

Then he
He --

he - - out of sight out of mind, as has been
before, doesn't do anything

for two months,

stated
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approximately, until he receives a notice of
deposition.

Aithouqh he was under the
.o produce

the

in the fall.
reintorcea

ov

V- n

^

y.

discovery

obligation

i? j . : . s~ c

But obviously,
of sanctions

rir

rrom nis raiiure to ao so to tnat o o m t .

j»

also,
e -. *_ t: 1 ~ U

^nc tnen

*-~ J -;
1- In = t- '

ii ~

C

<-». S

u '

V- — — /

16!

« 'J v.*

19|
20!

the sanction of default, basically,

21

drop-dead

22i

that the first motion

sanction

in this case.

We do net d:

for sanctions

appropriate, particularly

the u 11 i ~ j

was

since Mr. Godfrey d:

disclose his whereabouts.
2 5:

THE COURT:

I've

already ruled on

a ny way.

Go aheaa.
VR. PINKSTON:

That's correct.

In

case, Your Honor, where the employees of the
Beehive House did undertake
was after receiving

a search, granted i

the notice of deposition

an

those documents were not readily located, we

do

believe

that the sanction of default would be

appropriate, particularly

where the documents c

the information

in those documents

accessible

contained

through an alternate

Weil,

v_ v_ ^ rL -

4^

: een
eo

*"> r^

'~1

e x c e ^A.

_L ^, C '

v- ;

source.

is

We wcu

hew

: coras to

oen

co nsiaeratio:

that there could be reading on this.
had every opportunity

to attempt

Your

to obtain

die
the

documents

that would truly show what would be a

effective

substitution of documents

that are

no

longer available, evidently, and yet he has not
produced

any affidavit

from the bank

indicating

Pace

that

the

return

bank

checks,

v:e k n o w ?
the

has

bank

has

this

is

the

Banks

banks

evidence

Nov;, w h a t
reauestinc

checks.

sometimes

What
even

the

is

keep

there

K<

the

documentation?
it

some

seems

to me

additional

> c u m e n t a 11 o n

n e c a n.-: n a.

sorr.etirr.es
checks.

in

31

7 n e time

ror

you're

time
we

to

see

if

a c n~ '/t <- kvn-o,w

cc n s i a e r a t i o n

ci

::.ese

tcaav.

:en

every

ov ni s ow
r*

-^ o 1~

.OC-.

. n a t i':

PINKSTON
n v^ ;. o L .

19

. s t rom L. li tT

*^ :

20

THE COURT:

But your client hasn't.

21

MR. PINKSTON:

2z

that's correct, the Beehive House has

23

those documents.

24

default both defendants when there are seme

2 51

documents

Mr. Godfrey has not,
subpoenaed

It seem a harsh sanction

that have been produced

from

to
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could be reviewed
be sufficient

to determine whether

that

would

and to determine whether the bank has

7EE

COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Pinkston, I

appreciate your argument, thank you.
6|

MR. PINKSTON:

7'i

Thank you.

Kith regard
.hink all that

to Mr. Godfrey,
I've

heard Mr.

ry ^u
.elepnone cr in a face-:c-face
Ms. Skougard

15;

ever a year.

1

statement?

£i

Is there seme inaccuracy

MR. PIXKSTON:

attempt

ask the Beehive House

accu: :r.a:

No, Your Honor.

to look for the documents.

:c

I just

I just want to

clarify that with the Court, that he did himself

go

to the storage facilities and look for the
documents.
THE COURT:
facilities of Beehive

Oh, he went to the

storage

House?

MR. PINKSTON:

Correct, at the

Beehive
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House and the storage facilities at which tht
^eenive

House
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. PINKSTON:
THE COURT:

He --

He --

-- did that on July 10 o:

MR. ?INKSTON:

I'm

not sure

.ate was but he did indeed

participate

ittle too late.

'. c v e r y ,

it
L.

;

then

CX ^

k_/' w

^

O

:

a * * v-*

a;

exactly

r>~

-v

^

~

O ^ *

0

>U1

he

responses

a::e

a n<

set

a oeac.1

n "cr '

haven't

reviewed

my practice.

that particulctiv~

(Inaudible)

r> v- o o v

^ "P

u:

typical practice,

clearly

they were due in compliance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure which are -- do not exceed

30 days.

it seems to me that Mr. Godfrey has done
nothing
previous

to attempt
order.

to comply with the

And

virtually

Court's
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Accordingly,
case was filed

it seems to me that

in November of 1SS5.

These

this
issues

were in dispute at the time of filing of the
and counterclaim
inappropriate

in May of 1996.

and unreasonable

to take prompt

answer

It is

for parties

action in the face of

to fail

discovery

reouests.
Insofar as Mr. Godfrey
chink

:he metier, for sanctions

think

chat

it wasn't

enouch

is concerned, I

is well taken.

I

for the Court to order

.s cercre
s cona,

Q

*• -v* ^

'

on
zo ao ni s wcr

wasn't e ven a:

T

£^

. err.pt by him to get even i
. ves let alone the

. a v, c ,

; *\

checks

D recora on w n I c n to case an y cor.c ~us i c n :r.a:

there might be alternative
going to reach beyond

documents

the record

I think the request
to be stricken
default
order.

i_ w —

entered

in this default

and I'm

to do
for his

not

so.
pleadings

judgment, the

against him is appropriate

and I so

Page
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Mr. Rampton, you may respond

then with

:e Beehive House.

Do you

Go ahead.

have any reply to the arguments

that have been

made?
MR. RAMPTON:

Your Honor, just

Mr. Merrill has punctuated

6
7j

(Inaudible) Beehive House

in his

briefly

argument

is concerned.

i

THE COURT:

l

-

~ ° - - 2 i

"

..c^:

ON
;or .

w

— ^

i.. ^

i:

L - W

r* ^ ^ ~ ^

bus i ne s s

v: 11 w e n l_

-.::

. W

v_/

LA

—

d

>W

^— *-^ V-«

8
9

the

money?

0

purpose?
checks

21

to k n o w

Over
For

come

3

whose

in.

what

they
Now,

Skougard's
was

whose

benefit?

V,7 e h a v e

for

That's

got

to h a v e

where
those

the
checks

say.
it's

affidavit,

searching

signature?

established
at

least

cancelled

by

Deanne

implicitly,

checks

which

that

means

she
that
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checks in this case came back to the Beehive House,
they're not kept by the bank.
going

to have is microfilmed

The best the bank is
copies.

Nov;, I've been down this road
recently.

A handwriting

a microfilmed

very

expert can make nothing of

signature.

They want to say, Well,

we didn't

really spend that money, that's a

forgery.

I have no means of challenging

without

the original checks
THE COURT:

in my hands.

v
When was v^^
ou*

discovery
=nt s ?

reer.ive r.ouse r o r t n e s •
M R. . P. A M ? T 0 X :

that

;oo

When

made to Mr. Godfrey.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. RAMPTON:
made in June
documents

My deposition

request wa*

-- yeah, June 3rd of 1997 for

to be produced by July

these

10th.

Mr. Ralph Godfrey, by his own
deposition

testimony, established

meaningful

effort was made to recover

documents until July 10th.
on the record.

that no
these

That was his

testimony

It was their resoonsibilitv

to
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produce documents before that time.
We simply have no place to go without
those records.
going

It's as simple as* that.

That box was in their possession at the

time when all the defendants

in this case knew we

those records, we had asked

for them.

e House but of Mr. Godfrey,
we needed

granted,

that those

records

een in their counsel's office
-L.

-L L

r ecues '

t> L

tnev

ve
• * - O

: on t ro -

no

or

oi

'eview

V^ w- * .

w 6 6 T: 1 V 6

w. - . ^

s u o m i'

jr

HOUSe

t's
v; e

wichin

v an isne c

l c U U -z: ^ ^

wav

Not

them.

t's my position

. ne

not

to place blame, I'm not going to point

fingers.

needed

I'm

a

L.

I

* w

cii6.....ia

-. s e e

1S

o:

U K l

t ne motion
House

r or sanctions

is concerned,

insor ar as :r.e ^eeni ve

I am prepared

to rule also.

am very troubled by the comment of the
House

first

discovery

in failing

request

Beehive

to timely comply with the

that was made in June.

It was

over 30 days before any attempt was even made to
look for the files.

Beehive House knew

-- had to

I
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have a good
counterclaim

faith basis to file its answer

in May of 1996 and well knew as a

party to the case that the documents were
to the issue and failed
to preserve

and

to take adecruate

critical
measures

wnat they say they had in their

DOSsession
also troubled by the fact t
lowed a nonempioyee

to sear

ue s t i o n

t n.

tne re

i,

aucii.

e r or e

19|
20

subject of a previous

2l|

stand

2zj

Godfrey.

23|

sanctions.

2'

granted
House

sanction order and it does

in some different
I am going

footing

from that of Mr.

to do this by way of

Obviously,

the motion to compel

as to the Beehive House.

shall pay ail reasonable

Also, the

attorney's

was
Beehive

fees and
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costs incurred

in connection with this matter

- - or with this notion, argument

and

and

post-attorney

time in connection with the preparation of the
order on the motion; and shall produce on or before
September

15 the bank records, any evidence

there may be there that there
source of

is an

alternative

information.
Nov:, with regard to counsel's

abc ut whether

a h a n d w r i t i n a excert

however,

c aL

concern

— ex. vJ.

a.

I will censi:

• ^

T

r - r>

a

-UCK
s- W

that

mav

rile

ZZ

Beehive
as

wen

will, whether

any additional

sanction might be

appropriate, and specifically whether to strike
answer and counterclaim
enter

its default.

of the Beehive House and

And then it's largely

it may not be necessary

because

to do that if there are

actually alternate documents
otherwise

the

that can be provided

that would effectively

take

the

:e o:
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the documents
control

the Beehive House had under

and no longer can locate.
So

there must be compliance with

order in a timely fashion.
will

its

file

relief.

aOtion

If not, as I said, Tuck
.gainst seeking

ana

So, that is the order.

Rampton

to prepare

Court's

rulings here today.

questions

about

I'd

this

like Mr.

an order consistent

with

Are there

the

any

the nature of the Court's

:«:R. MERRILL:

this

order?

Thank you, Your Honor,

u o r ^ i < v- - *
a o c u t the
*. a

L.

—
. W w» O ^3

^

->

^

>~ S. ^

•~
v

p p rv p

or

_ >

r*

V n 12 aSi S. \.<
^.-v

to

CCUC6

m

r- '

n e c K s or a r r i a a v 11 s r r o m t n e o a n .< saying

those documents will be available?
make certain that

I comply

House will comply

adequately.

THE COURT:

(Inaudible)

I just want to

-- that the

Beehive

Well, you obtain

that are available on or before

tnat

documents

that date.

the bank's able to respond

As

to that
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subpoena

in a timely fashion is a separate

If that becomes an issue, you'd better
evidence

issue.

provide

as best you can as to exactly what

that

bank has, in what form it is and how readable it
and give me some basis on which to not
default

is

enter

against your client.
So, the way this is

work

is:

A request

"^ u s t succcsed

is made and

t o comely.

- - __ o

-

i.. Q

w

the

It's not

.

;-\

•• s e

Y-

-v- CL i

zees

•easonacie

.ttorr.ev' s

attorney's

costs

z e e s a n a costs, cy c r c e r .

answer your question with regard
to do?

You need to do what
MR. MERRILL:

understand

Does t n a t

to what you need

it takes to get

No, I understand

-that.

that, Your Honor, and I appreciate

clarificat ion.
THE COURT:

Okay.

the

I
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MR. MERRILL:
THE COURT:
brief

recess before

starting

a little

take a brief

the next hearing.

22
2
24

I know

we're

late this morning but we need to

settled.

(Concluded.)

21

The Court's going to take a

recess while these counsel

you folks get

20

Thank ycu.

leave

and
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